A token curated registry - or publicly available list than is generated by participants who stake their tokens - can be a valuable utility with a token that accrues value over time. This article by Wirelines explores the conditions under which such a scheme might work.
Voting is at the center of the mechanism but the literature is vague on the incentives of voters. The dominant model is the Schelling point model.² In this model, voters want to vote with the majority since only the majority side is paid. In the TCR mechanism votes are hidden until tallied but voters may use other information to deduce where the majority is headed. For example, voters may look to reviews or they may run tests to determine if a piece of software is of high-quality. If I look to reviews to discover if a piece of software is high-quality and I know that you do the same, then if I discover the software is of low-quality, I know that you will also discover the same.